The Carnegie effect is the harm inherited wealth does to a recipient's work effort. Carnegie effect estimates are few, reflecting that such effects are hard to trace. Most previous studies rely on data from limited-size surveys. We use information from administrative data covering the entire Norwegian population, enabling an examination of the heterogeneity of the Carnegie effect. Estimation results show significant reductions in labor supply for recipients of large inheritances. We find that Carnegie effects differ according to transfer size, the recipient's age and eligibility for other transfer programs, and the existence of new heirs in the family chain.
I. Introduction
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This study contributes to the knowledge about short-term Carnegie effects by exploiting exceptional Norwegian register based administrative data. Even though the Carnegie effect may be measured with error, biased downward due to measurement problems because of anticipated bequests, we identify responses materializing in the period shortly after the transfer. Further, we add to the understanding of Carnegie effects by discussing empirical evidence across population groups. Because we have access to a large panel data set for 1997-2010, covering the whole population, we can enter a relatively broad and detailed discussion of Carnegie effects. The previous literature on Carnegie effects (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm 1994; Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner 2010) has had limited scope for more detailed analysis, as these studies predominantly were based on evidence from sample surveys, with restricted sample sizes.
The Carnegie effect is measured by addressing information on three labor supply response indicators: inheritor's wage income, working hours, and early retirement takeup. Identification is based on comparing inheritors to nonrecipients with similar characteristics, using propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) . To avoid possible short-term anticipatory effects, the matching is done three years before receipt of inheritances. Moreover, to see how effects evolve over time, we measure responses one to six years after they receive bequests. As a control, we use the same specification to describe inheritor's behavior one to six years prior to transfers, when no behavioral differences between recipients and nonrecipients are expected.
Response heterogeneity is measured along several dimensions, based on both characteristics of the heirs and attributes of the setting in which they make their decisions. First, we examine the age dependency of the Carnegie effect, highlighting that many recipients are in their fifties or sixties. The interaction with public transfer schedules, such as the early retirement scheme, is important in this perspective. Second, given that there are (fixed) costs of finding a new optimum, as is well established in the labor market literature (see, for instance, Cogan 1981; Altonji and Paxson 1992; Chetty 2012) , we expect to observe a nonlinear relationship between responses and the size of the transfer, with responses increasing at an increasing rate with the amount transferred. Third, we also draw attention to the fact that inheritances may come with "strings attached." Parents have expectations and aspirations for their children, which means that they have opinions on how intergenerational transfers are used (Becker 1991; Haveman and Wolfe 1995; Chami 1998) , and consumption of leisure may be considered an inferior activity, as Andrew Carnegie seemed to think. Intergenerational transfers may follow a replication norm, where parents step into a chain of intergenerational transfers, which is referred to as the "golden rule of bequests" (Bevan and Stiglitz 1979) or "indirect reciprocity" (Arrondel and Masson 2006) . If such constraints are working, we expect recipients without children to show stronger responses than recipients who are constrained by having offspring.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present findings from the literature on Carnegie effects and refer to some relevant perspectives and studies given our focus on response heterogeneity. The empirical approach is presented in Section III, and results are discussed in Sections IV and V. First, in Section IV, we present overall estimates of the Carnegie effect for all recipients and for recipients of large transfers. In Section V heterogeneity is further discussed by addressing age dependency, including responses of people eligible for early retirement pensions, and by providing separate estimates for recipients with own heirs. Results of robustness tests are reported in Section VI, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Carnegie Magnitudes

A. Idiosyncratic Income Effect
In a model with perfect foresight, as the structural life-cycle labor supply model of MaCurdy (1980, 1982) , inheritance is anticipated and fully absorbed, yielding a downward shift in the entire life-cycle profile of labor, and no immediate response would follow the receipt of inheritance. However, there are several reasons for expecting any potential labor supply effects to materialize shortly after the actual transfer of resources.
First, there is uncertainty about both the timing and the amount of inheritance, which can generate a wealth shock. Recipients may receive larger or smaller inheritances than expected, dependent on how much of the wealth is consumed by the parents, to what extent people or organizations outside the family (such as religious movements) are supported through transfers inter vivos or through testament, and to what degree parents are able and willing to divide unequally among children. Second, although inheritances may be anticipated, credit constraints may prevent the heirs from incorporating the inheritance into their budget. Finally, risk averse recipients will avoid using money they do not fully control.
There is a sizable literature of life-cycle models where contemporaneous income is allowed to be affected by a transfer; see for example, Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) . Thus, given that inheritances are not perfectly foreseen and assuming a positive income effect on the consumption of leisure, we expect to observe reduced work effort after the transfer. One obvious reduction in labor supply may come from children's mourning following the death of a parent. Though we would expect grief to add to the responses in the very short run, it is unlikely to be an important aspect in a longer time perspective. In addition, we may expect to see a reduction in work prior to inheriting because of the care of an ailing parent prior to death.
Even though the change in labor supply as a result of bequest resembles the income effect of the standard labor supply literature-see reviews of the latter in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Keane (2011) -there are several reasons for not using estimates of the average labor supply income effect to represent the Carnegie response. Some of these idiosyncrasies of intergenerational transfers are further explored in the following with reference to the heterogeneity of the Carnegie effect.
3 The first type of heterogeneity 3. In addition, there is substantial uncertainty about the magnitude of labor supply responses in general. See, for instance, the different assessments in Chetty (2012) and Keane and Rogerson (2012) . Correspondingly, there is no general agreement concerning the size of the income effect (Kimball and Shapiro 2008; Hines 2013) . One line of research uses information on winners of lotteries to obtain income response estimates. For example, Imbens, Rubins, and Sacerdote (2001) estimate the propensity to earn among lottery winners and find propensities that range from -0.1 to -0.25, but on average approximately -0.11, and significantly more for those close to retirement age, whereas Kimball and Shapiro (2008) use hypothetical lottery winners and arrive at estimates close to -0.3.
is, however, inspired by findings of the labor supply literature, namely that there are fixed costs of adjustments, such as search costs and other adjustments costs, which means that agents can be expected to respond only to changes that are sufficiently large. A change in unearned income will only have an effect if it exceeds the fixed costs of finding a new optimum; see Cogan (1981) , Altonji and Paxson (1992) , and Chetty (2012) . Thus, we expect to see responses increasing at an increasing rate with the size of the transfer. Other studies of the Carnegie effect, such as Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) , also report such effects. Next, we discuss age dependency in the Carnegie response. Of course, the negative fiscal externality of bequests is particularly problematic if people at an early stage of life (the people Carnegie most likely had in mind) are affected, and there is permanence in the responses. On the extensive margin, an inheritance increases the reservation wage, which means that some recipients withdraw from the labor market. It can be expected that those who already have high income in the no-work alternative, for instance because of eligibility to public transfer schedules such as the early retirement scheme, are more responsive. 4 An important reason for not treating donations from parents as conventional lump sum income for the beneficiaries is that they may often come with strings attached. In the exchange model of intergenerational transfers (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985; Cox 1987) this is highlighted, as parents use transfers strategically to engender desired behavior, for instance, to obtain attention from their own children. Thus, according to the exchange model perspective, intergenerational transfers are devices for controlling children's actions. Similarly, in an altruism model, there has been focus on the importance of "having the last word" or controlling the last actions in a temporal sequence (Hirshleifer 1977) in order to derive the positive outcomes of the "rotten kid" behavior; see Becker (1974) , Bergstrom (1989) , and Bruce and Waldman (1990) on the rotten-kid theorem and the Samaritan's dilemma.
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Tied transfers may also come from mutual obligations, resulting from the interactions of attitudes and expectations within the family (Haveman and Wolfe 1995; Chami 1998) . There are several variants of this type of family tie in the literature, characterized by different concepts. For example, Arrondel and Laferrère (2001) use the term "indirect reciprocity" to mean a system of transfer between generations where emotions, expectations, and obligations play important roles. "Impure altruism" is another characterization (Laferrère and Wolff 2006) . 6 Such behavior may also develop into principles of donee behavior characterized as a "golden rule of bequests" (Bevan and Stiglitz 1979) : people bequeath an equal amount to what they inherited themselves, plus or minus some adjustments for luck over the life cycle. Irrespective of the precise mechanism and what terms are used, we expect that heirs outside a direct line of kinship are less affected, implying that such effects will manifest in larger labor supply effects among recipients without children. 4 . In Norway, all residents are members of the National Insurance Scheme, so there are no incentives to hold on to a job because of employer-provided health insurance. 5. The quote from Andrew Carnegie in the Introduction may indicate that he warned against children freeriding on their parents' altruism (Samaritan's dilemma). 6. See also Gatti (2005) and Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) on the relationship between altruistic parents and work incentives for children.
B. Previous Studies
As already noted, the literature on Carnegie effects is relatively small, and the few studies are based on data sources of limited size. Most contributions focus on unanticipated bequests, similar to the approach of the present study. A notable exception to this is Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) , where models with both unanticipated bequests and perfect foresight are estimated. In the latter case, the inheritance variable is discounted back to age 25. Two data sets are exploited in the estimation of the models: the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which includes both inheritors and noninheritors, and the Treasury's Estate-Income Tax Match Sample (EITM), which is a sample of wealthy descendants and their heirs. Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) find that the labor supply responses are small, both under the perfect foresight and the unanticipated inheritance hypotheses. One possible explanation put forward is that the PSID data do not adequately represent recipients of large transfers.
The EITM data are also used by Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) , who examined labor market behavior of recipients before and after they received inheritances, such as transitions in and out of the labor force and effects on income growth. Thus, identification of effects comes from response differences generated by variations in the size of transfers. They find clear indications that large inheritances reduce labor force participation, whereas effects on labor earnings are smaller. Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) focus on the binary work-retire decision. Using 1994-2002 U.S. survey data from the Health and Retirement Study, they find a significantly higher probability of retirement among those who receive inheritances, increasing with inheritance size. They were also able to split bequests into expected and unexpected and find higher responses to unexpected inheritances.
The study by Elinder, Erixson, and Ohlsson (2012) uses a small panel of wealthy decedents and their children. They find immediate labor supply effects that increase with the age of the recipient and the size of the transfer. Moreover, compared to Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) , effects are reported to be larger and longer lasting.
III. Empirical Framework
A. Data Descriptions
In contrast to most of the previous literature the present study uses data from administrative registers, which means that we can exploit information for the whole Norwegian population. Behavioral effects in terms of responses in wage income, early retirement, and working hours (on the intensive margin) are discussed, utilizing information from various administrative registers that can be linked by unique personal identification numbers. A key data source is the Inheritance Statistics (Statistics Norway 2014), based on a register of all Norwegian inheritances by recipient. Inheritances are reported to the tax authorities whether they are liable for inheritance taxation or not. The only source of missing observations is that very small estates are not always electronically registered by the tax authorities.
7 Savings accounts and housing wealth constitute the two largest 7. Our data include few inheritances of less than NOK5,000 (equal to US$660 in 1998), as the tax authorities reduced the administrative burden by not recording estates that were far from generating inheritance tax. Important elements of our empirical design are that we follow inheritors over time, both before and after receipt, and that we let nonheirs represent counter-factual outcomes (not receiving transfers). Thus, we assign a time window for the transfers to take place, and make sure that we have at least three years of observations both before and after the transfer Further, in the descriptions of effects, we refer to "before transfer" and "after transfer" periods to examine the behavior of recipients and nonrecipients in the labor market (income, working hours, retirement) for up to six years before and six years after the transfer. As for the data from the Income Statistics for Persons and Families, we primarily use information for the years [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] 11 which means that a person inheriting in 2000 is observed for three "before transfer" years (data for 1997, 1998, and 1999) and in six years of the "after transfer" period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . As the recipients are distributed throughout the time window 2000-2004, we get data points scattered over the 13-year period, the transfer year plus six years before and six years after the transfer. There are no reasons to expect macroeconomic conditions to have had any substantial effects on results, as the period under consideration is characterized by a large degree of stability. Even though the financial crisis of 2008-2009 affected the Norwegian economy, effects were much smaller than those seen in other countries (Berg and Eitrheim 2013) .
In Norway, during the period of study, it is unlikely that any reduction in wage income should stem from a reduction in wage rates. Thus, we interpret reductions in wage income as generated by adjustments in hours of work, at the extensive and/or the intensive margin. As we will return to soon, the identification technique is based on letting nonrecipients represent the counter-factual outcome. A propensity score matching technique is used to match donees and nondonees. To avoid anticipatory effects, the year three years prior to the transfer year is used for the matching.
We limit the sample to persons who are between 18 and 66 years old (to avoid children of school age and old age pensioners) 12 and exclude individuals not observed in all years, except those who enter or exit the sample due to age. As wage income is used as the main indicator of behavioral response (some evidence on working hours and early retirement is presented too), the study is restricted to responses of wage earners. Limiting the study to wage earners means that we exclude persons who are self-employed 8. Life insurance is included in the inheritance with its cash value. Transfers to trusts is considered as a nonfamily transfer, since it is forbidden by law to set up a trust that benefits one's own family. 9. Note that this information is based on formal or contracted weekly hours of work, not actual hours. 10. We use inheritance statistics covering the period 1998-2006. Persons from households that we know have inherited in the years outside of 2000-2004 (that is, in the years 1998, 1999, 2005, and 2006 ) are excluded. 11. In the construction of variables measuring previous income, we use accumulated information over several years, also involving data from years prior to 1997. 12. Note that the effect on early retirement is one of the outcomes of interest. The formal retirement age in Norway is 67. prior to inheriting.
13 However, we acknowledge that receiving an inheritance could prompt a switch from wage earning to self-employment, also noting that transfer of firms to the next generation are examples of bequests coming with strings attached. Later, in Section VI.C, we explore the possibility that some wage earners may have used the inheritance as a basis for setting up their own business, that is, becoming selfemployed after inheriting, and to what extent this explains outcomes. Individuals with zero income in the whole period leading up to the period of inheritance are also excluded.
14 These restrictions leave us with 1,684,967 persons, followed over at least five years. For 317,945 of these individuals we also have information about hours of work over the period 1998-2006, obtained from the Wage Statistics.
For married couples where one of the partners receives an inheritance, findings from the labor supply literature suggest that the spouse's labor supply is affected by changes in the budget constraint too; see, for example, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) . An advantage of our paper, compared to the previous literature, is that we account for effects on both the heir and the spouse of the heir. We assume that couples have a common economy, implying that both heirs and spouses are defined as recipients. 15 As we have the information about who is the direct recipient, we will later (Section V) look at whether the effect of inheritance receipt differs between the direct recipient and the spouse. Persons who live in a multiple-person household, but are classified as singles, are excluded from the data set. 16 Note also that all income and wealth variables are transformed by the inverse hyperbolic sine function.
17 Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for the full sample and the sample that is restricted by access to information about hours of work, respectively. Looking ahead to separate analyses for recipients of larger transfers, we also show separate figures for persons who have inherited more than NOK300,000, which is roughly the mean inheritance. 18 The tables clearly suggest that the recipients are not similar to the rest of the population, reflecting that this is not a randomly selected group. Further, the differences are not coming from deviations in age only: for example, there is a larger fraction of recipients (32 percent) who have attained college or university degrees than nonrecipients (28 percent), and this fraction is increasing with the size of the inheritance. 19 13. Self-employment is defined as having higher total business income than wage income in the years before the transfer. 14. Five percent of the observations are excluded due to self-employment, mostly men. An additional 5 percent are excluded due to zero wage income. These are mainly people on social security benefits, along with a few students. Although we exclude observations with zero income prior to inheriting, we allow for zero wage income after inheriting. 15. We assign the full inheritance sum to both the recipient and the spouse. As matching is not dependent on the sum of inheritance, dividing the transfer between the spouses would not matter. The composition of the "large inheritance" sample would, however, be somewhat affected. 16. These are mostly grown children registered as living in their parent's household, and represent a small number of observations. 17. The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is defined as: ihs(y) = log y + ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 1 + y 2 p . 18. All sums are deflated using the consumer price index, and given as Norwegian kroner (NOK) in 1998; US $1 = NOK7.55 according to the exchange rate in 1998, which means that NOK300,000 equals US$40,000. 19. Also, the fact that wage income increases with the inheritance size differs from the Swedish sample studied by Elinder, Erixson, and Ohlsson (2012) , where high transfers are correlated with low wage income. Table 1 Descriptive e Not all persons in the matched sample are in the 1999 data set, which explains differences in the number of observations.
From the National Educational Register, we have information about parents' level of education, but the data do not contain information about parental age. However, there is a close connection between recipient's age and parents' age at the time of their death. Bequests from parents in Norway are normally left by the last surviving spouse, so if one parent dies early, this will not affect the timing of inheritance. Of course, some Summed over the period 1993-1998. c Transfers received in the period 2000-2004. d Not all persons in the matched sample are in the 1999 data set, which explains differences in the number of observations. inheritances may originate from other relatives. In our data, about 75 percent of the inheritances are from parents to children. For the remaining transfers, it is not possible to distinguish between different donors, such as grandparents, siblings, etc. Note also that for the subsample for which we have observations on working hours (Table 2 ), the differences between noninheritors and inheritors are smaller (for wage income in particular), probably due to the requirement, in the establishment of this data set, that all persons work continuously throughout the whole period. This data set includes all public sector employees, but covers only parts of the private sector. Characteristics of public sector employees give a higher share of females and a higher education level in the "working hours sample" compared to the general sample. Figure 1 further elaborates on age differences, comparing age density of inheritors with age density of the general population (as represented by the data set established for the present analysis) for the year 1999. The figure confirms that the population of inheritors is not representative of the general population. Because of the natural timing of bequests, inheritors are on average older than the rest of the population, which will result in higher observed pre-inheritance wage income and wealth in this group. On average, the recipients are 45 years old in 1999, which means that they are 46-50 years old at the time of inheriting. In addition, the age distribution of inheritors peaks at around age 55, whereas for the general population, between 18 and 66 years old, the peak is at age 35. In the next subsection, we discuss how to obtain unbiased estimates of the Carnegie effect, given that recipients belong to a selected group and given that we use the nonrecipients to describe counterfactual outcomes.
B. Data Balancing with Propensity Score Matching
A possible identification strategy is to study only the recipients over time (before and after the transfer), as done in Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) , refraining from using information on nonrecipients. However, results are then in danger of being confounded by unobserved time effects, and it is challenging to disentangle the Carnegie effect from other life-cycle adjustments. When employing observations of nonrecipients there exist various methods to handle the covariate differences just described. We use matching to improve the balance between the data sets of recipients and nonrecipients. Matching techniques hold the promise of including the covariates in a more flexible way than standard parametric regression methods, as regressions may be vulnerable to the curse-of-dimensionality problem. See, for example, Imbens (2004) , Blundell and Dias (2009) , Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), and Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) . In addition, we also combine matching with regression analysis in some parts of the analysis.
In the identification of the Carnegie effects we exploit that there are many households who have characteristics and a predicted probability of inheriting close to the households who receive transfers. We use variables such as age, education, previous wage income, and wealth to construct the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) , that is, the estimated probability that a person receives an inheritance given the values of all variables. As the propensity score function is not directly related to the outcome variables, estimates of effects obtained via propensity score matching is expected to deliver results that are more robust to misspecification compared to results of standard methods, such as linear regression (Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch 2013) .
Using the treatment terminology, the Carnegie effect (CE), a CE , is an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated,
where N is the number of units in the treatment group, and K is the set of comparison units matched to unit i. Thus, outcome for individual i after inheriting (D = 1), Y 1 i , compared to the outcome without inheritance, Y 0 i , is empirically addressed by letting "person j" represent the no-inheritance situation for individual i. In other words, the identification relies on the matched individuals providing the counter-factual outcome of not receiving bequests. In the main specification, we use nearest-neighbor matching, which means finding one match for each recipient; no weights are involved, and the number of recipients dictates the number of matches, N. As discussed by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) , the number of observations matched to each treated observation is a tradeoff between bias and precision. Using more matches, the average difference in propensity score between treated and nontreated observations 20. As the recipients belong to a selected group of the population, the effects derived cannot be interpreted as overall average effects. increases, as each subsequent match is further away from the treated observation. At the same time, as more matches allow for more information to be used, precision increases. With a very large number of treated and control observations, we think precision is a less pressing concern than bias. Nonetheless, we have also used a specification where each treated observation is matched with three controls, and the results of this alternative matching methodology will be referred to in Section IV.
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The two main identification assumptions in matching are unconfoundedness and overlap (or common support) (Imbens 2004) . The assumption of unconfoundedness means that, conditional on the propensity score, the potential outcomes are independent of treatment. We argue that the timing of inheritance receipt is to a large degree coincidental and that the large set of control variables available makes it less likely that there are biases in the comparison between recipients and nonrecipients. Thus, the unconfoundedness assumption holds. The matching is done three years before the receipt of inheritance to avoid possible anticipatory effects (people adjusting to the transfer in advance). Matching is done with replacement and within years (or equivalently, there is exact matching on years) to avoid time effects affecting outcomes. 22 The nonrecipients are defined by not having inherited in the period used for observing inheritances (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . This means that they may have already inherited or may inherit in the period after 2006. The possibility of later transfers may introduce a downward bias into our estimates of Carnegie effects.
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Given the outcomes we investigate, pre-inheritance wage income is an important matching variable. Further, as inheritors are older and have higher education than noninheritors (see Table 1 ), and because being in a couple increases the probability of inheriting (two are more likely to inherit than one), these variables are obvious candidates in the estimation of the propensity score. We have explored several different specifications to find the best fit. To guide the specification, we have looked at how closely the covariates of the matched treated and control group fit, using t-tests. In addition, inspired by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) , we have split the sample into ten equally large groups sorted on the propensity score and looked at the balance of covariates within the groups.
The preferred specification uses a logit procedure, 24 with the following explanatory variables: inverse hyperbolic sine transformations (IHS) of wage, capital, and business income; IHS of financial wealth, housing wealth, vacation housing wealth, and debt; IHS aggregated wage, capital, and business income for a period before the matching year (from 1993 to the year before matching); IHS square terms for the previous variables; age dummies; gender; a dummy for marriage/cohabitation; an interacted term of gender and marriage; and dummies for high school and university education (for the person as well as for the person's father and mother). The results for the participation model are presented in the Online Appendix A, Table A .1, along with mean equality tests in Table A.2. 25 The mean equality test shows that our matching procedure is 21. As an additional robustness check, we also use an inverse probability weighting estimator (Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder 2003) . 22. There are many control persons available for comparison within each year. We also impose a caliper of 0.00001 to assure that no matches are too different. 23. Note that in Section VI.B we estimate the effects on a sample conditioned on the control group having parents alive over the whole period, and recipients inheriting from their last living parent. 24. The matching is implemented in Stata with the package psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi 2014 successful in balancing the data set over the dimensions included in the model. Descriptive statistics of the matched samples of inheritors and noninheritors are presented in Tables  1 and 2 . As the present study discusses the heterogeneity of the Carnegie effect, examining how it varies with respect to the size of the transfer, the age of recipients, the existence of new heirs in the chain, and the recipient's eligibility to early retirement, we also give a brief overview of the empirical strategies to that end. The effect of early retirement is discussed by using early retirement pension takeup as the dependent variable (whereas income or working hours are used as dependent variables for the other dimensions). The identification of effects of age and new heirs combines propensity score matching and OLS regressions.
26 Given that we believe we have obtained a balanced matched data set, it is straightforward to include interaction effects in a regression framework. Therefore, in contrast to the more common practice of examining subgroups one at a time, we estimate an equation where we (in practice) let the Carnegie effect, a CE , be explained by various characteristics and interactions between them, including dummies for age group and whether the recipient has their own heirs or not.
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IV. Size and Nonlinearity of the Carnegie Effect
First, we establish to what extent an overall Carnegie effect can be found, and in case it is, how it varies over time and with the size of the transfer. We discuss the heterogeneity of the Carnegie effect with respect to the size of the transfer by employing a separately matched data set, whereas in the next section we study heterogeneity by adding in explanatory variables directly in regressions, based on the matched samples.
The first column of Table 3 presents estimates of the effect on wage income of receiving an inheritance by reporting average differences in IHS wage income between recipients and nonrecipients over the 13-year time period, six years before and six years after the transfer year. 28 Recall that outcome estimates are based on separate estimation for each period on all matched pairs. Given the identification strategy, it is reassuring to see that there are no signs of effects on income prior to the transfer. Moreover, we see a fall in wage income among inheritors after the transfer, in accordance with the Carnegie conjecture and previous findings in the literature (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 26. Many authors have discussed the benefits of combining matching or propensity score weighting and linear regression. Most of the discussion is aimed at ways in which regression adjustment can improve efficiency of the matching method. The intuition behind using both methods is that regression adjustment can be used to alleviate the effects of remaining covariate imbalances, using supplementary regression analysis to increase efficiency (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Rubin and Thomas 2000; Abadie and Imbens 2006) . The additional regression method is mainly aimed at situations where the treatment and comparison groups are unequally sized (matching with replacement), in which case one may use a weighted regression, where the comparison units are weighted by the number of times that they are matched to the treated unit. Because we have access to very large data sets, with ample possibilities of finding suitable matches, regression adjustment in matching is not employed here. 27. This setup is similar to Djebbari and Smith (2008) , although they also control for idiosyncratic heterogeneity. Another difference is that our estimations involve a full interaction of all covariates. 28. Remember that the matching is based on individual characteristics three years before the transfer. 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm 1994) . When looking at results for "all inheritances" there seems to be a gradual and temporary wage income response to the receipt of an inheritance: the coefficients turn negative at the year of receipt, and the effect size increases gradually thereafter until the second year. 29 The point estimates suggest that the inheritors reduce their income by approximately 2.4 percent two years after the transfer. However, none of the estimates are statistically significant. Table 1 shows that mean inheritance is approximately 30 percent higher than mean wage income for the recipients, although the median inheritance is lower than the mean wage. In other words, there is a substantial share of inheritances that are smaller than the average wage income. If there are fixed adjustment costs in the optimization process, as suggested by several studies of the labor supply literature, it is likely that smaller inheritances will have small or no effect on labor supply. Therefore, one could alternatively let these recipients enter the control group and compare them to those who get large inheritances. This procedure would be similar to the framework of, for instance, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) and Elinder, Erixson, and Ohlsson (2012) , where identification is based on the size of the transfer. Since we have a populationwide sample, we take a different approach and do a matching separately for recipients of large inheritances (see Table 4 for an alternative method). Thus, Table 3 presents separate estimates for inheritances larger than NOK300,000 (roughly the mean inheritance). 30 For larger inheritances we find a much more distinct pattern than for the full sample, in accordance with the hypothesis of adjustment costs. When doing this, we find an estimated response of minus 3 percent in the first year, and approximately minus 7 percent in the subsequent five years. In the sixth year the response is somewhat lower and no longer statistically significant.
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Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the results in Table 3 . 32 Results using a specification with three-nearest-neighbor matching are presented in Online Appendix B, Figure B .1, showing that results are very similar to the results of Table 3 (as already denoted, the standard errors are somewhat smaller). In Online Appendix B (Figure B .2) we also show estimations results when employing an inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator (Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder 2003) for all inheritances and for large inheritances, respectively. This method implies that all observations are used in a regression, which is weighted by the inverse of the estimated propensity score. The propensity score is estimated using the same variables as in our matching models. The IPW estimation results are close to estimates derived by the main matching specification. It is also worth noting that the standard errors in the later years are larger.
33 Table 4 shows a further split of responses by the size of the inheritance and confirms that the effect on labor supply is increasing with the size of the transfer. Despite smaller coefficients and less statistical significance, the overall pattern of a post-inheritance decline in wage income is found for inheritance above the median. Instead of matching separately by each subgroup, we here estimate an OLS on the matched sample for all recipients, with a dummy specification for each of the quantiles 0-50th percentile, 50-75th percentile, 75-90th percentile, 90-95th percentile, and above 95th percentile, and for each year separately. For comparison, we also apply this method to the same data sets as established by the split in Table 3 . We see that using a dummy variable for inheritance on the overall matched sample gives very similar coefficients (as it should do), but that a methodology involving an interaction dummy for large inheritances results in less clear results, although parameter estimates are still significant. The main reason for the latter is that it is challenging to obtain a well-matched sample for large inheritances (see the values prior to the transfer in Table 4 ). We therefore prefer a separate matching for recipients of large inheritances to ensure that the comparison group is sufficiently 30. As the matching is done separately for each subgroup, recipients of large inheritances are matched with persons based on a participation model with different parameter values than the one used for all recipients. 31. In Table 3 , standard errors are calculated by default by psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi 2014) . The calculation does not account for the fact that the propensity score is estimated. As a robustness check, we have also calculated standard errors by bootstrap (not reported in the paper). There are only small differences between the two sets of standard errors, and no clear direction in the differences. 32. We have also obtained estimation results for the same specification when using matching without replacement. Effects for the "large inheritance" data set are somewhat smaller, but we basically see the same pattern as in Table 3 . 33. When using the matching estimator only matches where both control and observation are present in data are used, which excludes some observations in later years. The use of the IPW estimator implies that all available observations are included, and data sets may thus be unbalanced toward the end of the estimation period. similar. 34 Note, however, that adjusting for the higher level of wage income in the preinheritance years, the pattern over time and the drop in years after receipt is almost the same in the dummy approach as in the results in Table 3 . To show the relative importance of inheritance with respect to income, in the lower part of the table, we report the mean and median inheritance in relation to income across groups.
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To illustrate the economic implications of the Carnegie effects that we find, we use the (significant) estimates for the large transfers (Table 3) . We use the estimated average reduction in income, 6.6 percent, to calculate the corresponding decrease in yearly working hours, and then use figures for how many receive large inheritances to obtain an estimated loss in working hours. Based on a measure for the average labor supply of Norwegians in 2004, the income reduction corresponds to a reduction of 100 hours of 34. The reason for using the dummy interaction approach in Table 4 is that results by the propensity score matching method are vulnerable to the small number of observations near the top. The dummy interaction approach, however, illustrates in an intuitive and flexible way how the coefficients grow as we move towards larger inheritances. 35. Although intuitively appealing, studying income responses to inheritance weighted by income gives interpretational difficulties, as income is the dependent variable, and the variable inheritance over income is (strongly) negatively correlated with income levels. work per recipient of large transfers, which in turn means that approximately 620 personyears are withdrawn from the labor market in one year. When also accounting for the effect lasting for six years and aligning to national figures (for one year), our results correspond to the labor supply being 0.19 percent higher if there was no Carnegie effect, that is, as obtained if the government confiscated all transfers.
Given this estimate of aggregate Carnegie effects on working hours, one may speculate to what extent the recent abolishment of the Norwegian inheritance tax (in 2014) has influenced labor supply. In the period under consideration, the Norwegian inheritance schedule implied that transfers were taxed progressively, by 20 percent at the maximum, above NOK550,000.
36 Simple calculations based on the average large transfer, reported in Table 1 , suggest that recipients on average received NOK800,000 before tax, and paid approximately NOK135,000 in taxes. We may approach the effect of the tax relief following a hypothetical elimination of the inheritance tax in 2004 by uprating the estimates of Table 3 linearly by the increase in income. For example, in terms of effects on tax revenue, the loss working through less income tax corresponds to an additional 3 percent reduction in revenue, when the direct loss from the abolition of the scheme is 1.7 billion Norwegian kroners.
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As denoted by the literature focusing on the measurement of income responses to changes in taxes (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012) , income responses reflect a diversity of behavioral responses. To obtain separate estimates for the effect on working hours at the intensive margin, we use the subsample with information about hours of work over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Recall from Section III that individuals in this sample need to be employed over the whole observation period and that we only have information about contractual work. People who retire or completely stop working will not show up in this sample, which implies that only effects on the intensive margin are obtained. 37. However, note that this calculation only accounts for effects working through recipients of large transfers.
When using the same identification strategy as for income, we obtain results for working hours that are hard to interpret due to very large standard errors (see Table B .1 in the Online Appendix). We therefore use a somewhat modified empirical strategy, defining the outcome with a dummy indicator, which takes the value 0 if working hours are reduced from their level in the year of matching and 1 if hours of work are similar or higher. The matching procedure is the same as previously used. The results are presented in Figure 3 , showing that the share of people cutting their working time is up to one percentage point larger for recipients. However, the effects are statistically significant only in the three years nearest to the transfer.
Our Carnegie effect results, although using another method for identification, are qualitatively similar to results in Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) , in finding a small change in working hours and somewhat larger changes in wage income. We also confirm the result from Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) that large inheritances lead to stronger labor supply responses. Quantitatively, our estimates of the effect on labor earnings are larger than in both these papers. The time pattern of the labor supply responses is also similar to the findings of Elinder, Erixson, and Ohlsson (2012) .
V. Further Response Heterogeneity
So far, we have split the initial sample into recipients with an inheritance smaller than the mean inheritance (smaller than NOK300,000) and recipients with above-mean inheritances. In the following, when we discuss how Carnegie effects vary with respect to the age of recipients and the existence of new heirs, we use the "large transfer" subsample and employ the propensity score matching technique in combination with regression analysis, as discussed in Section III. Estimation results are obtained by employing a standard OLS regression, including the inheritance indicator and its interactions with dummies for age group and whether the recipient has heirs or not. We also present estimation results for some other covariates: gender, marital status, dependent children, 38 and educational level. Educational level is included because it may be a proxy for high income or may influence financial literacy and the ability to plan.
Note that the specification includes direct effects of all additional covariates and all possible interactions between the covariates. With a fully flexible model where all characteristics are allowed to interact with each other, it is difficult to evaluate the point estimates. Therefore, we compute the average marginal effect of inheritance on wage income for each subgroup. The marginal effect is the difference in the predicted margins of IHS wage income for those who inherit compared to those who do not inherit within each group; for example, for female recipients compared to female nonrecipients. Table  5 shows these marginal effects by age, existence of heirs, gender, marital status, dependents, and level of education, together with the benchmark-the overall marginal effect of inheritance (reported in the first column of Table 5 ). Table 5 Marginal Effects Inheritances larger than NOK300,000 (US$1 = NOK7.55).
Carnegie effects for four age groups are reported in Table 5 . The average age of heirs (at receipt) is about 49 years, which is probably older than the sons who Andrew Carnegie had in mind when he was concerned about a "general deadening of talents and energies." Moreover, Table 5 confirms that responses vary across age groups, with the youngest and oldest age groups showing large responses, while results for recipients in their forties and early fifties are found to be smaller and less significant. These results suggest that transfer magnitudes are not large enough to move middle-aged people away from their stable positions in the labor market. We find that the youngest age group responds immediately at the time of inheritance receipt and exhibit lower wage income in all years after inheriting, while the oldest inheritors are more sluggish in their response and exhibit the strongest decline four years after inheriting.
With respect to the results for the young recipients, we expect that being a young inheritor is a good indicator of an unexpected inheritance. Either parents have died young or the bequest has been left by relatives other than parents, such as grandparents. One would think that the age at death is a good indication of the unexpectedness of an inheritance. Because bequest from parents in Norway are (predominantly) left by the last surviving spouse, the rare incidence of both parents dying early may explain unexpected inheritance. In such an unlikely event, one would expect the mourning period to be important. Alternatively, bequests from someone other than parents are also likely to be unexpected. Thus, we believe that the responses among young recipients may reflect the effect of an unforeseen inheritance, more than for other age groups. Furthermore, young individuals or households are more likely to be liquidity constrained, which can explain responses in the short run even when inheritances are anticipated.
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Because we observe declining wage income for the age group approaching retirement, it is reasonable to conjecture that this is influenced by responses on the extensive margin; that is, some individuals in this group use the transfer to withdraw completely from the labor market. In this perspective, the choice of when to retire is affected by the sudden receipt of an inheritance. We further investigate extensive margin responses for this age group by providing estimates for the probability of retirement before normal retirement age. In the Norwegian public pension scheme the retirement age is 67, but early retirement is available from age 62. Uptake of an early retirement pension before the formal retirement age (67 years old) is eligible to employees that participate in a pension scheme through a collective agreement, called AFP. The self-employed are not eligible to the scheme. The AFP scheme covers the public sector and about half of the employees in the private sector. For the time window when we measure transfers of inheritance, [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] , approximately 20 percent of all persons 62-66 were on the early retirement scheme.
The relationship between early retirement and inheritance is described in Figure 4 , where the outcome is the difference in the share of inheritors and noninheritors who have taken early retirement. The share of inheritors that retire early is consistently around two percentage points higher than the share among noninheritors, and statistically 39. We have experimented with an additional indicator for liquidity constraint, the degree of loan-to-income (LTI). We find larger responses for recipients with high LTI (3 or more), but also that the marginal effects are not statistically significantly different from marginal effects for heirs with lower LTIs. We conclude that the potential effect of being liquidity constrained is most likely captured by age. significant three to four years after inheriting, which is in line with the results in Table 5 . 40 The results point in the same direction as the findings of Brown, Coile, and Weisbenner (2010) , who show that the probability of retirement increases for inheritors in the United States.
While Table 5 highlights the varying response by characteristics of the inheritor, Table 6 presents evidence on whether these marginal effects are significantly different across groups. Even though point estimates suggest that single recipients respond more, there is no significant difference between the responses of singles and recipients that are in a couple. 41 However, we see that female recipients reduce their labor supply more
Figure 4
Effect of Inheritance on Early Retirement. Subsample Conditioned on Larger Bequests Notes: The difference between recipients and nonrecipients in share using early retirement scheme, and the 95 percent confidence interval. Maximum number of matches: 6,247.
40. Because we condition on two post-matching years, and a maximum age of 67, there are relatively few observations being eligible for early retirement, and the standard errors are large. 41. As stated in Section III.A, we assume that couples have a common economy, implying that both heir and spouse are defined as recipients. Because we have information about who the direct recipient is, we have also looked at whether the effect of inheritance receipt differs between the direct recipient and the spouse; in other words, if bequests from own parents affect own labor supply differently compared to bequests from the spouse's parents. The magnitudes indicate a stronger response to inheritance from own parents than when the transfer originates from the spouse's parents, but differences are not statistically significant. than male recipients. This result is consistent with a large literature documenting that women have a higher income elasticity than men. The results of Table 5 suggest that a strong detrimental effect on labor supply is evident among those who do not have any direct heirs (that is, their own children of any age), suggesting that recipients are restricted in their use of bequests by new heirs in the "family chain." However, it could be argued that the lack of response among parents comes from caring for dependent children (children below 18 years of age), or that having dependent children is a proxy for strong attachment to the labor force. The separate estimation results for the effect of dependent children (Table 5) do not provide any clear answers, but given that effects are not statistically significant, they do not give support to the hypothesis that the effect works through having dependent children. A further worry could be that inheritors with and without heirs might be quite different. In particular, the difference between inheritors with and without heirs might be caused by a correlation of having an heir with other characteristics that reduce the Carnegie effect, such as inheritors without heirs having lower wage income levels and relatively lower attachment to the labor market. We explore this in more detail in Section VI.B. Although acknowledging the indicative character of this evidence, we see results that comply with a "strings attached" conjecture (see Section II). This result suggests that there are factors involved that limit the Carnegie effect.
VI. Robustness Checks
A. Unobserved Heterogeneity
A disadvantage of the propensity score matching estimator is that it only accounts for observed (and observable) covariates. If there are unobserved factors that simultaneously affect the probability of inheriting and the wage income outcome (selection on unobservables), the usual matching estimator can be seriously biased. In the presence of longitudinal data, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) proposed a combination of matching methods and difference-in-differences techniques that may accommodate selection on unobservables and weaken the strong underlying assumptions of both methods (Blundell and Dias 2009) . According to the matching difference-in-differences (MDID) technique, time independent unobservable individual effects cancel out by taking differences over time. Given that we compare recipients and nonrecipients over an observation period (t 0 ,t 1 ), the matching estimator now becomes Table 7 shows results when applying the MDID method for estimating the effect of receiving a large transfer. Because we have many observation periods, one must make a choice with respect to the observation period (t 0 ,t 1 ). The table shows results for two alternatives: one where t 0 is the year before inheriting and another where the initial level is based on average wage income in the three years up to the point of inheriting.
The results of Table 7 are encouraging, as estimates based on the MDID technique are close to the estimates based on levels. These results therefore do not suggest that unobserved heterogeneity represents a major source of bias. The overall negative effect on wage income of inheritors after the (large) transfer is approximately nine percentage points. However, needless to say, the MDID method also relies on assumptions that may not hold.
B. Testing Family Ties with more Parental Information
In Section V we found that inheritors without their own heirs reduced their work effort more than inheritors with heirs, which was explained by obligations to later generations discouraging recipients with direct heirs from using the inheritance on their own consumption of leisure. In the data used so far, we have included all inheritances, irrespective of the donors' kinship. To obtain a better test of this hypothesis, one would ideally restrict the analysis to data where bequests are transferred from parent to child (and not between others). The main reason for not conditioning on kinship in general is that the register data are not complete with respect to family linkages, so conditioning on information about parental transfers would cause a large drop in the number of observations.
As it is of interest to check to what extent the dissimilar results for inheritors with and without direct heirs are replicated in a data set generated by stricter conditions, we employ a data set in which we have the possibility to link parental information from the National Population Register. For the inheritors, we require that the inheritance is left by the last surviving parent, and for the nonrecipients used in the comparison, we require that at least one parent is alive during the entire comparison period (which is up to six years after the assigned year of inheritance receipt). Table 8 presents results for the smaller sample and compares them to the initial estimates for the direct heirs/no direct Inheritances larger than NOK300,000 (US$1 = NOK7.55).
heirs dimension, obtained from Table 5 . We see that the tests for significant differences are weakened with the smaller sample, but that the overall results stand. We still find that recipients with no direct heirs have a larger propensity to spend the inheritance on leisure. However, significantly different response estimates are obtained only in the first year after inheriting. As indicated by the consistently negative coefficients prior to inheritance reported in Table 5 , it could be that inheritors without heirs have substantially lower wage income levels at the outset, and therefore lower labor market attachment and higher income elasticities. 42 To explore further the theory that recipient's responses are restricted by a new generation awaiting support, we try to directly match inheritors with and without heirs.
43 Thus, as a control group for inheritors without heirs, we use the most similar inheritors with heirs. The results are presented in Figure B .3 in the Online Appendix B, and the results are in line with the differences between inheritors with and without heirs reported in Table 6 , except for yielding much higher coefficients and a divergent result in the sixth year. It should be noted though that the relatively small number of both treated and possible control observations make the results somewhat uncertain. Inheritances larger than NOK300,000 (US$1 = NOK7.55).
c Maximum number of matches, that is, from the year of matching until one year after receipt.
42. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing up this point. 43. For both samples presented in Table 8 .
C. Entrepreneurship
Recall that we exclude the self-employed and restrict the analysis to wage earners, defined as those having had higher wage income than business income in the years before transfer. However, we cannot rule out that some inheritors may have used the acquired funds to start up new businesses. Thus, part of the decline in wage income might not reflect increased leisure, but follows from transitions into self-employment and a start-up period, in which the persons allocate very little wage income to themselves. Some may also have inherited the ownership of a small family business and for that reason changed from being a wage earner to becoming self-employed. There are some studies that report positive effects of windfall gains (both lotteries and inheritance) on the probability of entering self-employment; see Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) using Swedish data and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) using British data. A standard interpretation of a positive windfall effect on entrepreneurship is that the windfall relaxes liquidity constraints. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a, 1994b) use longitudinal data from the United States to study both the transition into self-employment and the probability of survival as an entrepreneur. They find that receipt of an inheritance has a substantial positive effect on the decision to become self-employed, both on the amount of capital invested in the firm and the probability of survival of the firm.
In our data we see that when self-employment is defined as having business income greater than wage income there is a small and mostly insignificant increase in the fraction of self-employed among donees (Table 9 ). Furthermore, when using an even more narrow concept of self-employment defined by sole proprietorship, we find no effect (not reported). However, in Norway there is only a small percentage of the population who are solely self-employed, which means that a larger fraction may have a combination of wage income and income from self-employment. Hence, we check to what extent our main result holds if we include business income in the income definition; results are reported in the last column of Table 9 . As the effect of inheritance is slightly smaller for this income concept, these estimation results suggest that part of the decline in the labor supply of wage earners is substituted by an increase in business activities, at least in the long run, even though a very small fraction of wage earners shifts into self-employment because of inheritance.
VII. Summary
Recent discussions of the reasons for taxation of estates or inheritance, as in Kopczuk (2013) , assign a key role for the Carnegie effect in the overall judgment. In this perspective, it is problematic that the literature providing estimates of Carnegie effects is rather limited. The results of our study warn against using other income effect estimates to characterize Carnegie effects because the response heterogeneity revealed clearly signifies that Carnegie effects are idiosyncratic and therefore should be obtained from observations of behavioral responses to intergenerational transfers. Simply adopting income effects from other labor supply studies can be highly misleading. In this perspective, although we believe that results of this study are applicable to other economies, one should be aware of the contributions from the institutional setting too. For example, we have seen effects working through takeup of early retirement, which is likely influenced by the design of the Norwegian scheme.
We find clear evidence of recipients using bequests to increase their consumption of leisure shortly after the transfer. For persons close to retirement we find significant reductions in labor supply, but we also find large and significant effects for young inheritors. In addition, short-term estimates, as those obtained in this study, most likely underestimate responses, as there are reasons to believe that some bequests are foreseen and accounted for in the life-cycle plan of the recipients.
Even though we believe that our study provides a comprehensive description of Carnegie effects, the economic implications are still uncertain and mixed. The results with respect to young recipients denote long-lasting harmful Carnegie effects, but we also see signs that parts of the effects come from using the new funds for business activities. Carnegie effects are also curbed by adjustment costs in finding new optima, and, notably, we find results that support the theory that recipients may not feel entitled to use intergenerational transfers only on their own consumption of leisure when there is a new generation awaiting support. Interestingly, these latter two findings give support for two rather common features of the inheritance tax, given that one would like to limit the Carnegie effect: progressive rate schedules and higher tax rates for recipients that are not direct heirs. Also, given that we have found stronger effects for recipients of large transfers, it is important to emphasize that Norwegian wealth likely will increase in the future (Thoresen, Fredriksen, and Pedersen 2001) , which in turn implies that intergenerational transfers also will rise (despite the Carnegie effect), having consequences for the labor supply in the years to come.
